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Abstract 
In this paper, I examine the financial situation of older households. In addition, I examine whether 
employers’ initiatives to reduce planning costs via retirement seminars have an effect on workers’ saving. 
Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, I first show that many families arrive close to retirement 
with little or no wealth. Portfolios are also rather simple, and many families, particularly those with low 
education, hold little or no high-return assets. I further show that seminars foster saving. This is 
particularly the case for those with low education and those who save little. By offering financial 
education, both financial and total net worth increase sharply, particularly for families at the bottom of the 
wealth distribution and those with low education. Retirement seminars also increase total wealth 
(inclusive of pension and Social Security) for both high and low education families. Taken together, this 
evidence suggests that retirement seminars can foster wealth accumulation and bolster financial security 
in retirement. 
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Chapter 9
Saving and the Effectiveness of 
Financial Education
Annamaria Lusardi
This chapter uses information from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
to examine the financial situation of older households. We show that many
families arrive at retirement with little or no wealth, and with rather simple
portfolios: The major asset that families own is their house, and around 30
percent of households hold stocks. Yet, many families, in particular those
with low education, hold neither high return assets (stocks, IRAs, business
equity), nor basic assets such as checking accounts. Next I evaluate the rea-
sons for such low wealth accumulation and simple portfolios. I contend that
planning costs play a role in explaining many families’ financial situation. To
assess the importance of such costs, I examine whether the provision of
financial education via retirement seminars fosters savings and investment
in stocks. My evidence indicates that seminars can foster saving, particularly
for those with low education and those who save little. We also found that,
by offering financial education, wealth can be increased sharply, close to
20 percent in the total sample, and much more for families at the bottom of
the distribution and those with low education. Retirement seminars also
increase total wealth inclusive of pension and Social Security for both high
and low education families. Our estimates are comparable with findings of
Clark et al. (Chapter 10, this volume), who also confirm that financial edu-
cation can boost saving, particularly for those with low financial literacy.
Previous Studies
Previous studies have shown that many households make poor provision for
retirement. Women appear particularly vulnerable to the death of their
spouses and a husband’s death can precipitate the widow’s entry into
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poverty (Weir and Willis, 2000). Using a nationally representative sample of
older Americans, Warshawsky and Ameriks (2000) import their current
wealth into one of the most popular financial planners. They find that about
half of working middle-class American households will not have fully funded
retirements, and many will actually run out of resources very shortly into
retirement. One of the problems these authors, and others (Lusardi, 2002)
emphasize is that many households have limited resources until late in their
life cycles, or they start saving so late that it is impossible to accumulate
much. These results are consistent with Hurd and Zissimopoulos (2000),
who examine subjective information about past saving behavior. When
asked to evaluate their saving, a stunningly high proportion of respondents,
73 percent, indicated they saved too little over the past 20 and 30 years.
Similar findings are reported by Moore and Mitchell (2000), who deter-
mine how much wealth (including Social Security and pensions) older
households have, and how much they would need to save if they wished to
preserve consumption levels after retirement. They conclude that most
older households will not be able to maintain current levels of consumption
into retirement without additional saving. In particular, the median HRS
household would still have to save an additional 16 percent of income to
smooth consumption after retirement.
Other studies corroborate the lack of preparedness for retirement:
For instance, the national Retirement Confidence Survey indicates that a
large proportion of workers has done little or no planning for retirement
(EBRI, 2001). Only 39 percent of workers tried to determine with some accu-
racy how much they needed to save to fund their retirement, whereas a
decade previously, around one-third of workers indicated that they had tried
to calculate how much money they needed to save for retirement. When
asked why the calculation was not attempted, many respondents replied that
it was too difficult and they did not know where to find help to do it.
Lack of planning is also pervasive among older workers, 5–10 years from
retirement, according to Lusardi (2000, 2002). These findings are consis-
tent with several other studies that show many workers lack the informa-
tion necessary for making saving decisions. For instance, Gustman and
Steinmeier (1999b) report that many workers are poorly informed about
their Social Security and pension benefits, and they often err about the
type of pension plan they have and the benefits associated with it. EBRI
(2001) suggests that more than half of current workers expect to reach full
eligibility for Social Security benefits sooner than they actually will. An
earlier EBRI survey (1996) shows that only 55 percent of workers knew that
government bonds provided a lower rate of return (over the past 20 years)
than the US stock market. Other researchers, including Bernheim (1998)
and MacFarland et al. (this volume), also show that workers are often 
ill-equipped to make saving plans.
An important finding by Lusardi (1999, 2002) is that planning has effects
on both saving behavior and portfolio choice. Households whose head does
158 Annamaria Lusardi
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not plan for retirement accumulate much less wealth than households whose
head does do some planning. This result holds true even after accounting
for many determinants of wealth and including levels of pension and Social
Security wealth. In addition, households that do not plan are less likely to
invest in high return assets such as stocks.
Furthermore, planning for retirement is considered an important but
difficult task, so many employers have started offering financial education
to their employees. Financial education is particularly prevalent among
firms offering DC pensions, where workers have to make their own deci-
sions on how to allocate pension funds. An important question, then, is
whether these initiatives have any effects on worker behavior.
A few studies have looked at the effects of financial education in the
work place on private savings or contributions to pension funds.1 Empirical
findings are mixed: There is evidence of some positive effect of financial
education on saving and pensions, but the form of education seems to
matter. For example, Bernheim and Garrett (2003) and Bayer, Bernheim,
and Scholz (1996) find that programs that rely on print media (newsletters,
plan description, etc.) have generally no effect on pension participation
and contributions, even though the quality of financial information seems to
matter (Clark and Schieber, 1998). By contrast, retirement seminars are
found to be effective, but they seem to affect only certain aspects of behav-
ior—for example, pension participation and the amount of contribu-
tions—but not total saving levels (McCarthy and Turner, 1996; Bernheim
and Garrett, 2003). These and other similar studies suffer from severe data
shortcomings, since they lack information about workers’ characteristics,
the characteristics of their pension plans and total wealth levels. There
remain questions regarding the appropriate measures of wealth when look-
ing at accumulation for retirement, and how to treat housing when calcu-
lating retirement wealth. Some studies claim that few elderly sell their
houses after retirement and even fewer use contracts such as reverse mort-
gages to access their housing wealth.2 Most importantly, most previous
studies do not consider pension and Social Security wealth, two major
components of total household retirement savings. Leaving out these
components of wealth and/or concentrating on narrow definitions of
accumulation can have important effects on the empirical findings. In what
follows, I evaluate data from the HRS, which provides rich information
about household characteristics and wealth measures.
Empirical Approach
The HRS offers unique information that overcomes many of the short-
comings of previous research on saving and financial education. This survey,
covering a nationally representative sample of US households born 1931–41,
provides detailed information on wealth and the retirement process with
a focus on health, labor markets, and economic and psycho-social factors.
9 / Saving and the Effectiveness of Financial Education 159
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Questions about wealth are asked to the most financially knowledgeable
person in the household.3
Five types of HRS information are critically important to understand
saving and its interaction with planning, past economic circumstances,
expectations about the future, individual preferences, and pension and
Social Security wealth. The HRS provides several indicators about planning:
How much respondents have thought about retirement, whether they
attended a retirement seminar, and whether they asked Social Security
to calculate their retirement benefits. Hence, I concentrate mostly on the
effects of retirement seminars. Moreover, the HRS provides information
on several past negative and positive shocks, including past unemploy-
ment, episodes of distress, inheritances, insurance settlements, and money
received from relatives and friends. Most importantly, the survey reports
information about anticipated future resources and future events. This is
critically important since decisions to save are intrinsically related to the
future. In the HRS, respondents are asked to report how likely it is that
future home prices will increase more than the general price level, and how
likely it is that Social Security will become less generous in the future.
Respondents are also asked to report their expectation of living to ages
75 and 85, to work full-time after ages 62 and 65, and to lose their job in the
next year.4 In addition, respondents are asked to report the chance they will
have to give major financial help to family members in the next 10 years.
Another not yet well-explored dimension along which households can
differ is preferences, (e.g. risk aversion or impatience), both of which play
a pivotal role in saving decisions. One can infer preference information
from the HRS using the model developed by Barsky et al. (1997), who
explore people’s willingness to take gambles, to construct proxies for risk
aversion. Demographic variables that could be related to the impatience—
such as education, race, and country of origin—are also present in the
survey. Additionally, questions on smoking, drinking, health practices, and
regular exercise may be used to proxy for individual heterogeneity.
In the HRS, it is possible to link to the Social Security records of respon-
dents and use that information to calculate Social Security wealth.5 For any
household who did not provide consent to link to Social Security records,
we have used imputed Social Security wealth.6 It is also possible to con-
struct pension wealth from the self-reported pension information.7 Thus,
the data set offers a very complete measure of household resources to
examine saving behavior.
Household Saving Close to Retirement
Before looking at how financial education influences retirement wealth, it
is useful to first describe two measures of household (non-pension) accu-
mulation. The first measure, which I call liquid net worth, is defined as the
160 Annamaria Lusardi
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sum of checking and saving accounts, certificates of deposit and Treasury
bills, bonds, stocks, and other financial assets minus short-term debt. The
second measure, which I call total net worth or simply net worth, is
obtained by adding IRAs and Keoghs, housing equity, other real estate,
business equity, and vehicles to liquid net worth. Table 9-1 displays the
major components of wealth including retirement assets (IRAs and
Keoghs) and housing equity. All values are given in 1,992 dollars and the
sample includes all financial respondents between the age of 50 and 61
who are not partially or fully retired.
The first important result is that there are tremendous differences in
wealth holdings for households on the verge of retirement in the HRS.
While some households have amassed large amounts of wealth, others
have accumulated very little. Considerable differences in wealth are to
be expected, because permanent income (or average income over the
lifetime) varies widely. But the actual variation, from $850 in net worth for
households at the 10th percentile to $475,000 in the 90th percentile, is far
larger than variation in permanent income. It is also apparent that housing
is an important asset in many household portfolios, and furthermore many
people have no assets other than home equity. As mentioned before,
whether housing equity serves to sustain consumption at retirement is in
dispute. Retirement assets such as IRAs have been one of the fastest growing
components of household wealth in the last two decades, but the evidence
shows that ownership and the amounts invested in such tax-favored assets
9 / Saving and the Effectiveness of Financial Education 161
TABLE 9-1 Pre-retirement Household Wealth in the 1992 HRS Components of 
Household Wealth (Excluding Social Security and Pensions)
Percentile Liquid Net Worth IRAs and Keoghs Housing Equity Total Net
$ $ $ Worth $
5 6,000 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 27,980
50 6,000 0 42,000 96,000
75 36,000 15,000 85,000 222,200
90 110,000 45,000 150,000 475,000
95 199,500 75,000 200,000 785,000
Mean 46,171 16,492 61,613 227,483
(Std. Dev.) (178,654) (49,754) (100,646) (521,467)
Notes: This table includes HRS households whose head is 50–61 years old and not fully or
partially retired. The total number of observations is 5,292. All figures are weighted using
survey weights. Liquid net worth is defined as the sum of checking and savings accounts,
certificate of deposits and Treasury bills, bonds, stocks, and other financial assets minus short-
term debt. Total net worth is defined as the sum of liquid net worth, IRAs and Keoghs, housing
equity, business equity, other real estate, and vehicles. All values are expressed in 1,992 dollars.
Source: Authors’ computations.
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are heterogeneous across the sample. Even though not shown in the table,
a substantial portion of total net worth is accounted for by business equity:8
households owning one or more businesses are fairly rare (only 15 percent
of the sample), but their wealth holdings are large, median holdings are
worth $75,000.9 A second important point to note in Table 9-1 is the preva-
lence of households that arrive close to retirement with little or no wealth;
one quarter of HRS households have less than $30,000 in total net worth.
Of course, total net worth is only a partial measure of accumulation since
it omits Social Security and pension wealth; nevertheless, it is difficult to
borrow against retirement assets.
Wealth holdings across education, which can proxy for permanent
income, appear in Table 9-2. What is clear is that wealth differences both
within and across groups remain large. Wealth holdings are very low for
households whose financial respondent has less than a high-school educa-
tion, while households whose head is college-educated have more than
twice the wealth (considering medians) of households with high-school
education. If one considers a restricted measure of wealth such as liquid net
worth, the scenario worsens considerably. Many of the households with low
education have little or zero holdings of financial assets and little net worth.
To account for the fact that normal or permanent income varies across
households and is one of the most important determinants of wealth,
in the empirical work I always consider wealth as a ratio of permanent
income. Permanent income has been constructed by regressing total
household income on a set of household demographics (age, sex, race,
marital status, region), workers characteristics (working in small firms,
working part time, belonging to unions), occupation and education dum-
mies and these occupation interacted with age, and the subjective expecta-
tions of income changes in the future (whether future income will increase
or decrease, subjective probability of losing work next year and that health
will limit work activity in next 10 years).
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TABLE 9-2 Pre-retirement Household Wealth by Education in the 1992 HRS
Education Level Number of Liquid Net Worth $ Total Net Worth $
Observations
Median Mean Median Mean
Elementary 329 0 707 9,000 82,215
Less than high school 1,042 100 16,429 39,000 110,324
High school 1,876 5,500 29,668 90,000 183,678
Some college 1,041 10,000 47,312 122,700 243,571
College 800 28,000 90,910 186,000 358,848
More than college 204 41,000 175,160 234,000 636,366
Notes: This table reports the distribution of liquid and total net worth across education
groups. All figures are weighted using survey weights.
Source: See Table 9-1.
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More information on the composition of wealth in household portfolios
by education groups is given in Table 9-3. Results show that wealth is
concentrated among households whose financial respondent has at least
a high-school education; this group is also more likely to holds stocks and
bonds. Focusing on households with low education shows that over one-
third of Hispanics have only an elementary school education, and almost
60 percent have less than a high-school education. Among Blacks, 40 percent
have less than a high-school education. Another important and striking
feature among Blacks and Hispanics is that they lack many of the assets
common to the portfolios of wealthier households, such as stocks, bonds,
and IRAs and few have even a checking account. In this sample, 57 percent
of Black households and 47 percent of Hispanic households have a check-
ing account, a finding consistent with results for younger households
(Lusardi, Cossa, and Krupka, 2001).
The Role of Financial Education
Many factors can explain the heterogeneity of wealth holdings close to
retirement. Households with low permanent incomes, those who are hit
by many shocks, and people who are impatient or expect large capital gains
on their assets, may save differently from others. In addition, planning
costs can explain some of the differences in wealth. To help confront
the problem of planning costs, some employers have started to offer some
form of financial education in the workplace. By providing information
and improving financial literacy, the hope is that seminars will reduce
planning costs and foster savings. Nevertheless, there is still much uncer-
tainty regarding the effects of seminars on savings. Several studies discern 
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TABLE 9-3 Asset Ownership by Education in the 1992 HRS (%)
Assets and Elementary Some High High Some College More than Total
Liabilities School School School College College
Check and saving 0.30 0.63 0.85 0.90 0.95 0.95 0.82
CDs 0.03 0.14 0.28 0.29 0.34 0.30 0.26
Bonds 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.27 0.07
Stocks 0.01 0.10 0.24 0.34 0.51 0.55 0.28
IRAs and Keoghs 0.05 0.16 0.41 0.48 0.62 0.71 0.41
Other assets 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.25 0.36 0.16
Businesses 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.20 0.18 0.29 0.15
Housing 0.48 0.64 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.83 0.74
Real estate 0.15 0.18 0.27 0.37 0.41 0.49 0.30
Vehicles 0.59 0.79 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.89
Debt 0.24 0.36 0.40 0.44 0.38 0.37 0.39
Notes: This table reports the ownership of assets across education groups. The number of
observations is 5,292. Figures are weighted using survey weights.
Source: See Table 9-1.
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a positive correlation between attending a retirement seminar and private
wealth or contributions to pension funds, yet it is not completely clear what
this correlation means. Attending retirement seminars is largely voluntary,
so it is possible that those who attend seminars are more likely to have an
interest in them, for example, because they have large wealth holdings.
Thus, it may be wealth levels that drive participation in retirement semi-
nars, but not the other way around. Similarly, attending retirement semi-
nars could simply reflect individual characteristics, such as patience and
diligence, both of which are also likely to affect wealth accumulation.
Attending a retirement seminar could then simply be a proxy for individual
characteristics and attitudes towards saving, rather than a measure of the
effects of providing information, improving financial literacy, and/or
reducing planning costs. Furthermore, as reported by Bernheim and
Garrett (2003), retirement education is often remedial, and thus offered in
firms where workers do very little savings. Since few data sets have enough
information to allow researchers to sort these effects out, findings regard-
ing the effects of retirement seminars are often difficult to interpret.
I seek to remedy these shortcomings by using the HRS to examine
the effectiveness of retirement seminars. One advantage is that the HRS
provides rich information on individual characteristics that might affect
saving. Another is that the detailed HRS information is more complete
than those used in previous studies; for example, Bernheim and Garrett
(2003) use limited and noisy data about private savings and other studies
have only information about pension contributions and pension wealth
but no information about private wealth.
To illustrate the strength of the HRS financial education variables,
Table 9-4 reports two indicators of planning activities: (i) whether the
respondent has attended a meeting on retirement and retirement planning
organized by his/her spouse’s employer and (ii) whether he or she has asked
Social Security to calculate retirement benefits (of husband or spouse). The
results show that respondents who are male, white, and married are more
likely to have attended a seminar. Households whose head has low education
or comes from a family of low education are less likely to have attended a
seminar. Of course, this might occur if such families work in firms that tend
not to offer such seminars. Nevertheless, similar findings are obtained when
considering those who have asked Social Security to calculate their retire-
ment benefits. Again, the better-educated, higher-income, white, and mar-
ried respondents are more likely to ask for information about Social Security
benefits. Households who plan are also more likely to have a pension and to
invest in retirement assets such as IRAs and Keoghs.
Several other household characteristics are also considered, including
whether the financially knowledgeable person in the household smokes
or stopped smoking, drinks heavily, thinks he or she should cut down on
drinking, does not exercise, and has talked to a doctor about health. All of
164 Annamaria Lusardi
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TABLE 9-4 Planning Activities Undertaken by HRS Pre-Retirees
Characteristics Attended Retirement Asked SS to Total Sample
Seminar Calculate Benefits
Demographics
Age 50–53 0.32 0.28 0.36
Age 54–57 0.38 0.34 0.36
Age 58–61 0.29 0.38 0.27
White 0.85 0.90 0.79
Male 0.58 0.54 0.51
Married 0.72 0.73 0.61
Less than high school 0.06 0.09 0.22
High school 0.30 0.38 0.36
More than high school 0.63 0.53 0.42
Family of origin has high 0.58 0.55 0.47
education
Income and wealth
Income  $25,000 0.11 0.14 0.29
Have pension 0.84 0.60 0.49
Have IRAs or Keoghs 0.63 0.63 0.41
General attitudes
Heavy smoker 0.10 0.15 0.18
Stopped smoking 0.45 0.42 0.37
Drink heavily 0.04 0.05 0.05
Feel should cut down on drinking 0.21 0.20 0.20
Do not exercise 0.27 0.37 0.46
Talk to a doctor about own health 0.83 0.81 0.77
Subjective expectations
Expectation that health will limit 0.36 0.38 0.39
work activity in the next 10 years
Expectations to live to 0.68 0.67 0.65
age 75 or more
Expectations to work full-time 0.43 0.49 0.52
after age 62
Expectations that SS will become 0.59 0.62 0.59
less generous
Expectation that house prices 0.46 0.48 0.49
will increase faster than
prices in the next 10 years
# of observations 506 1,191 5,292
Notes : This table reports the proportion of respondents who have attended a retirement
seminar or asked Social Security to calculate retirement benefits. All figures are weighted
using survey weights.  indicates that the means are calculated on the sample of workers only.
Source : See Table 9-1.
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these correlate strongly with planning activities and underscore the finding
that individual heterogeneity should be taken into account in the empirical
work (see also MacFarland, Marconi, and Utkus, Chapter 6, this volume).
When looking at the probabilities of future events, another important
and unique source of information in the HRS, one finds that those who
attend a retirement seminar or asked Social Security to calculate retirement
benefits are less likely to work full-time after age 62. Those who plan are also
somewhat less likely to report that they expect house prices to increase
more than the general price level in the next 10 years.
To assess the importance of seminars on retirement wealth accumulation,
I regressed wealth measures on an indicator variable for whether respon-
dents have attended a retirement seminar and an extensive set of controls.10
The dependent variable is the ratio of non-pension wealth to permanent
income, in some cases also controlling on pension and Social Security
wealth. First, I consider financial net worth, which adds IRAs and Keoghs to
liquid net worth, and next I consider total net worth; both are divided by
permanent income. Even after this normalization, variation in the ratio of
wealth to permanent income remains wide. Households in the first quartile
of the distribution have financial wealth that is only 1 percent of income,
while in the third quartile, financial wealth is approximately equal to per-
manent income. Considering net worth, households in the first quartile
hold wealth equal to approximately 75 percent of their permanent income,
while at the third quartile, they hold three times the amount of permanent
income. Among the explanatory variables, I use age and age squared (the
latter to capture the hump-shaped profile of wealth holdings), and also I
evaluate demographic factors, such as the total number of children, the
number of children still living at home, sex, race, country of birth, marital
status, region of residence, and education. Permanent income is included
among the regressors to account for the fact that accumulation can vary
across levels of permanent income and to test whether rich households are
simply a scaled-up version of poor households. The model also accounts for
health status, past shocks, measures of risk aversion and impatience, and
future expectations as described above. Additionally, the model accounts
for whether households have pensions since these workers are more likely
to work at firms that offer retirement seminars.
I also account for other motives to save, apart from providing for retirement.
For instance, some may save to leave a bequest to future generations, which I
account for by using information on people’s reported intention of leaving
bequests to heirs11 and expectations of giving financial help to family member
in the future, and I allowed for a precautionary saving by including the subjec-
tive variance of earnings risk calculated from the expectation of losing their
job in the coming year.12 I also account for the fact that households accumu-
late little because they can rely on help from relatives and friends in case they
run into severe financial difficulties in the future. Conversely, the possibility of
receiving bequests is controlled by a variable indicating whether at least one
166 Annamaria Lusardi
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parent is alive. The model also incorporates the respondent’s subjective expec-
tation of future events that can affect wealth accumulation, for example
his/her expectation that Social Security will be less generous or that house
prices will increase more than the general price level.
To explore the impact of retirement education, I turn next to the empir-
ical results. If education is likely to be offered to workers who most need it,
one might expect the effect to be stronger at the lower quartiles of the
wealth distribution and among those with low education. Thus, I perform
quartile regressions and I also perform regressions across different educa-
tion groups since, as reported above, least educated families save very little
and invest in simple assets.
The main empirical results are summarized in Table 9-5 (detailed results
appear in the Appendix. Retirement seminars affect the lowest two quar-
tiles of the wealth distribution and they also affect the lowest two quartiles
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TABLE 9-5 The Effect of Retirement Seminars on Retirement Accumulation
Total Sample (%) 1st Quartile (%) Median (%) 3rd Quartile (%)
A. Financial net worth
Total sample 17.6** 78.7** 32.8** 10.0
Low education 19.5 95.2** 30.0** 8.8
High education 13.1 70.0** 19.4** 10.2
B. Total net worth
Total sample 5.7 29.2** 8.7 0.5
Low education 3.4 27.0** 7.1 4.0
High education 7.3 26.5** 6.5 3.6
C. Total net worth 
Pensions
Total sample 20.5** 32.7** 26.8** 19.5**
Low education 20.7** 31.4** 14.6* 18.2**
High education 19.4** 39.3** 31.2** 17.6**
D. Total net worth 
Pensions and Social 
Security
Total sample 16.0** 18.6** 20.4** 17.2**
Low education 12.7** 14.7** 12.7** 9.5**
High education 17.7** 25.4** 25.8** 17.0**
Notes : This table reports the percentage changes in different measures of retirement
accumulation resulting from attending retirement seminars. See Data Appendix for full estimates.
* Indicates that the estimates from which percentages are based are statistically significant at
the 10% level.
** Indicates that the estimates from which percentages are based are statistically significant at
the 5% level.
Source : See Table 9-1.
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of the distribution across education groups. Estimated effects are sizable,
particularly for the least wealthy. Overall, attending seminars appears to
increase financial wealth by approximately 18 percent (Table 9-5, Panel A).
This effect derives mainly from the bottom of the distribution, where
wealth increased by more than 70 percent. The effect is also large for those
with least education with increases in financial wealth close to 100 percent.
The reason for such large percentage changes is that households at the
bottom of the wealth distribution and those with low education have little
financial net worth and increases of $2,000—the average change in wealth
for those with low education that attend a retirement seminar—represent
very large percentage increases.
Results for net worth show a similar pattern. Attending a retirement
seminar increases net worth in the sample by approximately 6 percent.
Again, the effect is mostly coming from those at the bottom of the net
worth distribution. For the lowest quartile, attending a retirement seminar
increases wealth by close to 30 percent. Seminars affect mostly those with
less than a high-school education, increasing wealth by 27 percent for those
with low education and at the bottom of the wealth distribution. The effect
of seminars decreases steadily as one moves to higher quartiles of wealth
(Table 9-5, Panel B).
Note that these estimates may be a lower bound of the effectiveness
of retirement seminars, because the HRS provides no information about
when the seminars were attended. If workers attended them recently,
changes in saving behavior might not have affected wealth yet. Given that
wealth is a stock, it takes time for seminars to affect it. The data set also
contains no information on the content, length, and features of the semi-
nars and, as mentioned in MacFarland, Marconi, and Utkus (Chapter 6, this
volume), these could be important in evaluating and designing seminars.
These estimates may also be small because of the large set of controls
included in the regressions. Controlling for a smaller set of variables tends
to boost estimates for retirement seminars (Lusardi, 2003). Nevertheless,
regressions showed that it is important to control for the individual hetero-
geneity present in savings data.
More Comprehensive Retirement 
Resources Measures
To extend my analysis, I take into account two additional sources of retire-
ment resources: Social Security and pension. For the median 10 percent of
wealth-holding households in the HRS, as much as 60 percent of total
wealth is accounted for by Social Security and pensions (Gustman and
Steinmeier, 1999a). Overall, pensions and Social Security account for half
or more of total accumulation for households in all but the top decile of
the wealth distribution.
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Pension wealth is not evenly distributed, accounting for 7 percent for
those in the bottom quarter of wealth holders, but 31 percent for those in the
75th to the 95th percentile of households (Gustman et al., 1999), while the
effect of Social Security on the distribution of wealth is equalizing. As one
moves up the wealth distribution, the share of total accumulation due to pen-
sions increases while the share of Social Security falls (Gustman et al., 1999).
Incorporating a more comprehensive measure of total wealth accumula-
tion into the analysis is not without pitfalls. One reason is that pensions
and Social Security are not liquid: It is hard (if not impossible) to borrow
against such wealth and it is not clear that households with large pension
wealth can use it to smooth consumption prior to retirement. Second, com-
plex calculations are required to determine pension and Social Security
wealth (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1999b), and many workers lack informa-
tion on their pension.13 Nevertheless, these two components are so sizable
that it is important to analyze the effects of financial education on broader
measures of net worth.
In what follows, I first consider a measure of pension wealth, as reported
by HRS workers, which I sum to total net worth. I next add Social Security
wealth (measured as of the time of the interview) to the previous measure.
Hence, these models assess whether attending a retirement seminar influ-
ences not just total net worth but also accumulations in pension and Social
Security wealth. Panels C and D of Table 9-5 (and Appendix Tables A9-4
and A9-5) report the effects of seminars on these more comprehensive
measures of wealth.
Retirement seminars affect not only financial and net worth but also
total accumulation patterns. The economic significance of the estimated
effects is also in line with previous estimates. Overall, attending seminars
increases net worth inclusive of pensions by about 20 percent and total net
worth inclusive of pensions and Social Security by 16 percent. When using
these comprehensive measures of wealth, I find that all education groups
are affected by retirement education and estimates are significant as well
for every quartile of total accumulation.
Extensions
One possible concern in the evaluation of the effectiveness of retirement
seminars is that seminars may not be offered exogenously. That is, firms may
be more likely to offer seminars if they think workers are unprepared for
retirement. Moreover, workers who attend such seminars may do so because
they have a great deal of wealth and of course, as argued by Selnow
(Chapter 2, this volume), the cause and effect relationship between saving
and financial education are not entirely clear. If one could identify variation
in attending retirement seminars that did not result from differences in
saving, then it might be possible to distinguish between the hypothesis that
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knowledge causes the accumulation of wealth, and the hypothesis that
wealth causes the acquisition of knowledge. This can be analyzed via ran-
domized experiments, as in Duflo and Saez (Chapter 8, this volume) or
by using instrumental variables. This latter approach confirms the finding
reported previously: Retirement seminars are found to foster wealth accu-
mulation even when using instrumental variables estimation (Lusardi, 2003).
Additionally, seminars affect accumulation not only by changing how
much people save, but also how they invest their portfolios. Several authors
have emphasized that there can be large transaction and learning costs asso-
ciated with investing in stocks, which may explain why so many households,
particularly those with low education, do not invest in stocks (Haliassos
and Bertaut, 1995; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). As reported by Lusardi (2003),
retirement seminars influence the ownership of stocks: Those who have
attended seminars are more likely to hold stocks. Furthermore, employees
with low wealth holdings are most affected by seminars, reinforcing the
conclusion that education is remedial and mainly influences those house-
holds who otherwise might not hold stocks. Analysis by education groups
confirms that those with low education and lower wealth (less than $60,000)
respond to retirement seminars by purchasing more stocks, but there is no
effect of seminars for those with high education. This may explain why the
effects of seminars are present and significant even for restricted measures
of accumulation, such as financial net worth, which includes stocks.
Our estimates compare well with other works: For example, they are
consistent with the findings of Bernheim and Garrett (2003) that also show
that virtually all measures of retirement accumulation are higher when
the respondent’s employer offers financial education. Most importantly, as
in this work, the effect is concentrated on the 25th and 50th percentile of
accumulation and decreases or disappears at higher percentiles, a finding
difficult to rationalize simply by appealing to tastes for saving. It is also
consistent with the findings of Clark and Schieber (1998) that employer-
provided education programs that increase the quality and type of financial
information increase participation rates as well as contributions in pension
plans. This may explain why the effects of retirement seminars get stronger
when I consider measures of wealth inclusive of pension. Our findings are
overall consistent with the work of Clark et al. (Chapter 10, this volume),
who show that those individuals with less financial knowledge such as
women are more likely to change their saving behavior after attending
a financial education seminar, again suggesting that seminars may help
those who display more difficulties in saving.
To put estimates in perspective, I have examined the effects of retire-
ment seminars across other relevant determinants of wealth. For those in
the first quartile of the net worth to permanent income ratio distribution,
attending a seminar has as large an effect as not smoking or having
received inheritances or money from relative and friends. The effect is also
comparable to have high education: College or more than college education.
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When looking at those with low education, seminars have a similar effect
on net worth as having pensions. Given the difficulties or costs of changing
these other variables, retirement seminars may represent a viable alterna-
tive to stimulate savings.
Other studies, such as Garman (1998) and the references therein, have
argued that financial education increases workers productivity and reduces
absenteeism to deal with personal financial matters and overall absences
from work. The value to employers of these benefits of financial education
is estimated at around $400, a figure easily above the costs of providing
financial education. While these studies are often qualitative and based
on small samples, they represent initial evidence from which to build more
research. If saving stimulus improves household well-being, retirement
seminars may be a worthy initiative. Examining data for workers who have
already retired, Lusardi (2002) shows that those who did not plan are more
likely to report a less satisfying retirement. Since lack of planning is usually
associated with low wealth, this may explain the link to retirement satisfac-
tion. A similar finding is reported by Panis (Chapter 14, this volume), who
finds that retired respondents with low wealth are much less likely to report
a satisfying retirement. Similarly, respondents with lower net worth report
more frequent signs of depression.
Conclusions
This chapter examines how retirement seminars help explain the wide
differences in retirement accumulation that we observe across older house-
holds. The results show that seminars are remedial and appear to affect
those at the bottom of the wealth distribution the most. The effects become
even stronger for every education group and every quartile of the wealth
distribution if pension and Social Security wealth are included in the house-
hold wealth measures.
These estimates imply that retirement seminars can influence the accu-
mulation of both net worth and broader measures of wealth. Both financial
and net worth can increase by 20 percent and a lot more across subgroups of
low education when workers attend retirement seminars. A broader wealth
measure, inclusive of pension and Social Security relative to permanent
income, rises by 15–20 percent for both high and low-education families.
While the provision of information and the reduction of planning costs
could play an important role in improving the financial security of many US
households, it should be recalled that only a small number of workers cur-
rently attends retirement seminars. Consequently, many remain untouched
by employers’ efforts to provide financial education. This fact represents an
important topic for future research and a challenge for policymakers.
Moreover, many of the households with low education or at the bottom of
the wealth distribution are minorities, particularly Blacks and Hispanics.
They not only save little but often do not hold any high-return and 
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tax-favored assets or even simple assets such as checking accounts. To under-
stand the saving behavior and the effectiveness of financial education for
these groups, it may be important to study them in isolation.
Data Appendix
The data used in this chapter are taken from the 1992 wave of HRS. The
HRS is a representative sample of individuals born in the year 1931–41
(approximately 51–61 at the time of the interview), through Blacks,
Hispanics, and Floridians were oversampled. The individual deemed most
knowledgeable about the family’s assets, debts, and retirement planning
was asked questions on housing, wealth, and income. As described in more
detail in the text, one distinctive feature of the HRS is the attention paid to
expectations about future events. A second innovation of the HRS is the
use of bracketing or unfolding techniques to reduce the missing data prob-
lems in the measurement of financial variables. In the HRS, respondents
who reported they did not know or refused to provide an estimate of the
size of a net worth component were asked to report the value in a set of
brackets. Smith (1995) and Juster and Smith (1997) evaluate these tech-
niques and a detailed description of their advantages in improving the
accuracy of information about household wealth.
The sample for the initial analysis I deleted respondents who were par-
tially or fully retired at the time of the interview, and only financial respon-
dents were considered between the ages of 50 and 61. The final sample
for empirical analysis (Tables 9A-2–A-5) additionally deletes respondents
who lack information on the variables used in the empirical estimation.
The self-employed are not asked many of the questions about subjective
future probabilities so they are deleted from the sample. Similarly, expec-
tations about changes in income are not asked to respondents who are not
working, so they are also excluded from the sample. Since the distribution
of the ratio of total and financial net worth to permanent income is so
wide, I trim the distribution and exclude the top and bottom 1 percent,
resulting in a total number of observations of 3,265. Appendix Table 9A-1
reports descriptive statistics of variables used in the empirical estimation.
The original sample which only excluded respondents who are retired or
younger than 50 and older than 61 had 5,292 observations; the decrease
to 3,265 is mainly due to the fact that some questions were only asked to
respondents who were working. There is little reason to believe that the
final sample suffers from self-selection. With respect to the original sample,
the final sample covers respondents who are a little younger, more likely to
be white (the fraction white is 0.79 initially versus 0.818 in my sample),
more likely to be born in the United States (0.89 initially versus 0.924 in my
sample), a bit more educated (0.11 have a college degree versus 0.129 in
my sample). Overall, differences between these two samples are small.
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TABLE 9A-1 Descriptive Statistics
 	
 
Financial net worth/permanent income 0.758 (1.261)
Total net worth/ permanent income 2.590 (2.628)
(Total net worth  pension)/permanent income 4.214 (3.512)
(Total net worth  pension  SS worth)/
permanent income 6.727 (3.741)
Stock ownership 0.290 (0.454)
Have not thought about retirement 0.224 (0.417)
Attended a retirement seminar 0.126 (0.332)
Age 54.40 (3.857)
# of children at home 0.806 (1.009)
Male 0.507 (0.500)
White 0.818 (0.385)
US born 0.924 (0.264)
Married 0.624 (0.484)
Divorced 0.185 (0.389)
Widowed 0.086 (0.282)
Separated 0.035 (0.177)
Northeast region 0.224 (0.417)
Midwest region 0.249 (0.433)
West region 0.185 (0.389)
High school 0.388 (0.487)
Some college 0.214 (0.410)
College 0.129 (0.336
More than college 0.106 (0.308)
Excellent health 0.276 (0.447)
Very good health 0.331 (0.470)
Good health 0.275 (0.447)
Past unemployment 0.361 (0.481)
Past shocks 0.328 (0.469)
Received inheritances 0.197 (0.397)
Received money from relatives 0.080 (0.271)
Received money from insurance settlements 0.057 (0.233)
High risk aversion 0.647 (0.478)
Moderate risk aversion 0.130 (0.336)
Medium risk aversion 0.108 (0.311)
Permanent income /1000 51.846 (20.990)
Expectation to live to 75 0.660 (0.276)
Expectation that SS will be less generous 0.605 (0.289)
Expectation that house prices will go up 0.480 (0.286)
Expectation to give major financial help to family 0.406 (0.307)
Heavy smoker 0.168 0.374
Heavy drinker 0.048 (0.214)
No regular exercise 0.416 (0.493)
Talks to doctors about health 0.783 (0.412)
Bequest 0.420 (0.493)
Parents still alive 0.686 (0.464)
Variance of income 2.010 (7.687)
Can rely on help from relatives and friends 0.431 (0.495)
# of observations 3,265
: See Table 9-1.
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TABLE 9A-2 Determinants of Financial Net Worth Accumulation in the 1992 HRS
Total Sample 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Constant 0.274 3.000 0.036 0.494 0.958 1.753 2.216 3.575
Seminar 0.137** 0.065 0.088** 0.011 0.134** 0.040 0.103 0.086
Health
Excellent health 0.144* 0.080 0.058** 0.013 0.071 0.048 0.146 0.102
Very good health 0.091 0.075 0.076** 0.012 0.073 0.045 0.108 0.095
Good health 0.069 0.074 0.048** 0.012 0.025 0.044 0.088 0.093
Pos./Neg. shocks
Past unemployment 0.004 0.047 0.023** 0.008 0.027 0.028 0.055 0.061
Past shocks 0.287** 0.045 0.067** 0.008 0.13** 0.028 0.279** 0.059
Received inheritances 0.248** 0.055 0.043** 0.009 0.254** 0.034 0.350** 0.072
Money from relatives 0.229** 0.077 0.022 0.013 0.118** 0.049 0.301** 0.103
Money from insurance 0.490** 0.101 0.089** 0.017 0.359** 0.063 0.570** 0.133
Risk aversion
High risk aversion 0.113* 0.068 0.007 0.011 0.004 0.041 0.021 0.087
Medium risk aversion 0.127 0.084 0.036** 0.014 0.020 0.052 0.042 0.109
Moderate risk aversion 0.186** 0.088 0.014 0.015 0.019 0.054 0.126 0.113
Subjective expectations
Expectation to live to 75 0.022 0.081 0.020 0.014 0.029 0.049 0.042 0.103
Expecting SS more gener. 0.067 0.073 0.007 0.012 0.015 0.044 0.105 0.095
Expecting house price up 0.261** 0.075 0.029** 0.013 0.064 0.045 0.280** 0.096
Expectation to give help 0.167** 0.070 0.031** 0.012 0.025 0.042 0.126 0.092
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Bequests and help
Bequests 0.312** 0.043 0.099** 0.007 0.203** 0.027 0.428** 0.057
Parent alive 0.068 0.050 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.030 0.004 0.064
Can rely on help 0.031 0.043 0.027** 0.007 0.045* 0.026 0.053 0.056
General attitudes
Heavy smoker 0.179** 0.058 0.038** 0.010 0.09** 0.036 0.190** 0.077
Heavy drinker 0.028 0.099 0.002 0.017 0.015 0.060 0.015 0.127
No regular exercise 0.091** 0.045 0.022** 0.008 0.06** 0.028 0.099* 0.059
Talk to doctor about health 0.161** 0.052 0.016* 0.009 0.035 0.032 0.172** 0.067
Income and pension
Permanent inc./1000 0.004 0.003 0.0008 0.0005 0.0005 0.002 0.001 0.004
Variance of income 0.003 0.003 0.003** 0.0007 0.008** 0.001 0.014** 0.003
Pension 0.029 0.050 0.0006 0.008 0.005 0.030 0.008 0.066
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.129 0.049 0.097 0.131
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
Notes: This table reports OLS and quantile regressions of the determinants of the ratio of financial net worth to permanent income. Models include
additional demographic controls including age, sex, race, marital status, number of children, education, regions, and a dummy for whether the
respondent is born in the United States.
Source: See Table 9-1.
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TABLE 9A-3 Determinants of Financial Net Worth Accumulation in the 1992 HRS
Low Education Sample (High School or Less)
Total Sample 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Constant 3.560 4.069 0.094 0.614 0.572 1.582 2.756 4.202
Seminar 0.127 0.099 0.051** 0.015 0.088** 0.041 0.070 0.115
Health
Excellent health 0.257** 0.099 0.025* 0.015 0.027 0.040 0.137 0.109
Very good health 0.198** 0.091 0.060** 0.014 0.064* 0.037 0.114 0.098
Good health 0.145* 0.087 0.023* 0.013 0.004 0.035 0.077 0.094
Pos./Neg. shocks
Past unemployment 0.001 0.059 0.02** 0.009 0.025 0.024 0.064 0.067
Past shocks 0.249** 0.061 0.04** 0.009 0.115** 0.025 0.25** 0.069
Received inheritances 0.166** 0.080 0.033** 0.012 0.183** 0.034 0.225** 0.093
Money from relatives 0.055 0.117 0.052** 0.019 0.034 0.050 0.010 0.137
Money from insurance 0.473** 0.137 0.082** 0.021 0.243** 0.058 0.737** 0.157
Risk aversion
High risk aversion 0.038 0.096 0.002 0.014 0.009 0.039 0.115 0.105
Medium risk aversion 0.038 0.121 0.035* 0.019 0.019 0.050 0.143 0.135
Moderate risk aversion 0.081 0.123 0.010 0.019 0.050 0.050 0.011 0.135
Subjective expectations
Expectation to live to 75 0.017 0.101 0.010 0.015 0.035 0.041 0.024 0.112
Expecting SS more gener. 0.061 0.095 0.005 0.014 0.025 0.038 0.0007 0.105
Expecting house price up 0.277** 0.095 0.04** 0.015 0.046 0.039 0.200* 0.105
Expected to give help to family 0.116 0.091 0.030** 0.014 0.031 0.037 0.093 0.104
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Bequests and help
Bequests 0.291** 0.059 0.063** 0.009 0.148** 0.024 0.341** 0.068
Parent alive 0.038 0.064 0.011 0.010 0.017 0.026 0.024 0.072
Can rely on help 0.019 0.057 0.008 0.009 0.022 0.024 0.036 0.065
General attitudes
Heavy smoker 0.165** 0.072 0.02** 0.011 0.058* 0.030 0.194** 0.082
Heavy drinker 0.144 0.131 0.007 0.020 0.054 0.053 0.008 0.138
No regular exercise 0.049 0.058 0.012 0.009 0.06** 0.024 0.024 0.066
Talk to doctor about health 0.127* 0.065 0.012 0.010 0.047* 0.027 0.114 0.075
Income and wealth
Permanent inc./1000 0.003 0.003 0.002** 0.0005 0.003** 0.001 0.004 0.004
Variance of income 0.017** 0.008 0.006** 0.001 0.011** 0.003 0.023** 0.011
Pension 0.021 0.062 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.025 0.005 0.071
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.105 0.028 0.076 0.121
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
Notes : See Table 9A-2. Estimates refer to the sample of respondents with high school education or lower.
Source : See Table 9-1.
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TABLE 9A-4 Determinants of Total Net Worth Accumulation in the 1992 HRS
Total Sample
Total Sample 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Constant 2.044 6.148 2.061 3.112 4.044 5.454 1.904 7.108
Seminar 0.149 0.133 0.308** 0.069 0.175 0.124 0.019 0.164
Health
Excellent health 0.560** 0.164 0.304** 0.088 0.455** 0.149 0.907** 0.195
Very good health 0.195 0.154 0.186** 0.081 0.291** 0.139 0.407** 0.181
Good health 0.170 0.152 0.218** 0.078 0.264* 0.136 0.432** 0.177
Pos./Neg. shocks
Past unemployment 0.290** 0.096 0.142* 0.050 0.313** 0.088 0.344** 0.117
Past shocks 0.522** 0.093 0.293** 0.050 0.392** 0.087 0.571** 0.115
Received inheritances 0.672** 0.112 0.293** 0.061 0.507** 0.106 0.813** 0.138
Money from relatives 0.723** 0.158 0.359** 0.085 0.728** 0.150 0.794** 0.200
Money from insurance 0.797** 0.208 0.561** 0.108 0.760** 0.198 0.641** 0.252
Risk aversion
High risk aversion 0.009 0.139 0.124* 0.072 0.131 0.128 0.369** 0.165
Medium risk aversion 0.106 0.173 0.140 0.092 0.166 0.161 0.421** 0.208
Moderate risk aversion 0.093 0.181 0.167* 0.095 0.231 0.168 0.103 0.218
Subjective expectations
Expected to live to 75 0.078 0.166 0.128 0.088 0.036 0.153 0.018 0.198
Expecting SS more gener. 0.125 0.149 0.021 0.078 0.045 0.137 0.139 0.184
Expecting house price up 0.452** 0.153 0.236** 0.082 0.447** 0.141 0.489** 0.186
Expected to give help to family 0.359** 0.143 0.079 0.074 0.284** 0.132 0.551** 0.176
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Bequests and help
Bequests 1.115** 0.089 0.543** 0.047 0.877** 0.083 1.288** 0.110
Parent alive 0.142 0.102 0.034 0.053 0.023 0.094 0.180 0.124
Can rely on help 0.008 0.088 0.084 0.046 0.135* 0.082 0.194* 0.109
General attitudes
Heavy smoker 0.479** 0.119 0.287** 0.065 0.433** 0.112 0.702** 0.146
Heavy drinker 0.324 0.203 0.232** 0.110 0.102 0.188 0.094 0.238
No regular exercise 0.268** 0.093 0.176** 0.050 0.219** 0.087 0.286** 0.114
Talk to doctor about health 0.309** 0.106 0.084 0.056 0.157 0.099 0.460** 0.129
Income and wealth
Permanent inc./1000 0.033** 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.013** 0.006 0.036** 0.008
Variance of income 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.021** 0.005 0.026** 0.005
Pension 0.174* 0.102 0.189** 0.054 0.186** 0.094 0.164 0.126
Adjusted/Pseudo R 2 0.158 0.112 0.113 0.130
Notes : This table reports OLS and quantile regressions of the determinants of the ratio of total net worth to permanent income. Models include addi-
tional demographic controls including age, sex, race, marital status, number of children, education, regions, and a dummy for whether the respondent
is born in the United States.
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
Source : See Table 9-1.
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TABLE 9A-5 Determinants of Total Net Worth Accumulation in the 1992 HRS
Low-Education Sample (High School or Less)
Total Sample 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Constant 4.485 8.556 1.939 3.418 0.915 5.813 0.632 14.238
Seminar 0.085 0.209 0.272** 0.089 0.134 0.146 0.131 0.373
Health
Excellent health 0.561** 0.207 0.243** 0.084 0.464** 0.145 0.862** 0.373
Very good health 0.233 0.190 0.203** 0.084 0.451** 0.131 0.355 0.338
Good health 0.052 0.182 0.113 0.079 0.304** 0.125 0.271 0.321
Pos./Neg. shocks
Past unemployment 0.225* 0.124 0.109** 0.054 0.269** 0.086 0.275 0.224
Past shocks 0.452** 0.128 0.270** 0.058 0.344** 0.091 0.420* 0.231
Received inheritances 0.895** 0.169 0.474** 0.075 0.658** 0.121 0.993** 0.310
Money from relatives 0.736** 0.246 0.436** 0.113 0.825** 0.178 0.757* 0.450
Money from insurance 0.994** 0.288 0.602** 0.129 0.971** 0.203 0.519 0.516
Risk aversion
High risk aversion 0.022 0.202 0.192** 0.088 0.110 0.141 0.440 0.343
Medium risk aversion 0.275 0.254 0.253** 0.111 0.337* 0.178 0.331 0.451
Moderate risk aversion 0.056 0.258 0.265** 0.114 0.053 0.182 0.059 0.449
Subjective expectations
Expected to live to 75 0.137 0.213 0.116 0.095 0.049 0.149 0.078 0.377
Expecting SS more gener. 0.071 0.199 0.101 0.086 0.096 0.137 0.047 0.355
Expecting house price up 0.568** 0.200 0.277** 0.090 0.537** 0.139 0.425 0.357
Expected to give help to family 0.107 0.191 0.059 0.082 0.255* 0.133 0.198 0.353
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Bequests and help
Bequests 1.118** 0.124 0.513** 0.055 0.860** 0.087 1.280** 0.226
Parent alive 0.006 0.134 0.035 0.059 0.175* 0.095 0.120 0.243
Can rely on help 0.035 0.121 0.024 0.053 0.070 0.085 0.321 0.223
General attitudes
Heavy smoker 0.367** 0.151 0.284** 0.070 0.357** 0.108 0.481* 0.277
Heavy drinker 0.422 0.276 0.256** 0.125 0.221 0.190 0.269 0.460
No regular exercise 0.227* 0.123 0.091* 0.054 0.165* 0.086 0.271 0.224
Talk to doctor about health 0.183 0.137 0.073 0.061 0.063 0.096 0.247 0.250
Income and wealth
Permanent inc./1000 0.038** 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.012** 0.086 0.038** 0.014
Variance of income 0.043** 0.017 0.031** 0.007 0.030** 0.012 0.062** 0.027
Pension 0.392** 0.130 0.269** 0.057 0.220** 0.091 0.397* 0.237
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.155 0.121 0.124 0.132
Notes : See Table 9A-4. Estimates refer to the sample of respondents with high school education or lower.
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
Source : See Table 9-1.
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Notes
1 Author’s computations among others is from the US Department of Labor’s
Abstract of 1998 Form 5500 Annual Reports.
2 Cf. McCarthy and Turner (1996), Bernheim (1995, 1998), Bayer, Bernheim, and
Scholz (1996), Clark and Schieber (1998), Madrian and Shea (2001), Bernheim and
Garrett (2003), Clark d’Ambrosio, McDermed, and Sawant (Chapter 10, this volume).
3 The implementation of new techniques to elicit information about wealth in the
HRS has led to rather accurate wealth reports. For a thorough examination of the
quality of HRS data and comparisons with other data sets, see Juster and Smith
(1997) and Smith (1995), and the Data Appendix.
4 An excellent examination of subjective probabilities in the HRS is provided in
Hurd and McGarry (1995) and Hurd (1996). See Lusardi (1998) analyzes the prob-
ability of losing one’s job next year and how this variable can be used to construct
a measure of the variance of earnings.
5 Special authorization is needed to access Social Security records. For detail on the
construction of Social Security wealth, see Mitchell, Olson, and Steinmeier (2000).
6 Alan Gustman and Tom Steinmeier provided the imputed Social Security wealth
data; see Gustman and Steinmeier (1999a,b).
7 For a detailed explanation of the construction of the pension data, see Venti and
Wise (2001).
8 For a more detailed discussion of the importance of business owners to explain
wealth accumulation, see Hurst and Lusardi (2004) and Gentry and Hubbard
(2000).
9 Whether business equity represents accumulation for retirement is unclear.
10 The description of the sample is provided in the Data Appendix.
11 HRS respondents are asked whether “they plan to leave a sizable inheritance to
their heirs.” Here, I have grouped together all respondents who answered “yes” to
this question, although several degrees of certainty exist (very likely, likely, etc.).
12 For detail on the construction of this variable, see Lusardi (1998).
13 Social Security wealth is calculated as the present value of the Social Security
benefit payable in the form of an annuity from retirement until death. The variable
I consider refers to the HRS respondent entitlement as of 1992; see Mitchell, Olson,
and Steinmeier (2000) for calculations of Social Security wealth.
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